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attack out to three hundred miles from
naval bases, and to limit Soviet
land-based air support. In 1946,
Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral
Vladimir Alafuzov developed a positional scheme of supremacy under
land-based air cover up to one hundred miles from naval bases, and conditional sea control by large surface
vessels with limited air support in a
“far zone” out to three hundred miles.
This fell short of command of the expanses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black
Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan.
Only submarines with long endurance
could operate in the open ocean, but
Stalin preferred medium submarines,
conceived for operations in near seas
against an amphibious threat. The projected battleships would have had an
operational radius only half that of
their contemporaries in oceanic navies. Only current Italian battleships,
also designed for near seas, had such
limited autonomy. To operate across
the open ocean was a ludicrous concept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a
defensive posture for at least ten to fifteen years to come. Stalin’s projected
“large sea and oceanic navy,” to use
the Soviet term, was likely created for
a hoped-for more robust traditional
strategic defensive in contiguous seas.
The evidence in this book, if not its
title, lends support to Herrick’s judgment of a Stalinist strategy of limited
command of the near seas. To suggest
that it was “the first step on the road
to global naval power,” as does series
editor Holger Herwig in the preface,
would require Stalin and his navy to
demonstrate a conceptual leap for
which neither had shown a proclivity.
Mind-sets resist change. Even in the
navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who
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inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up
Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deployments did not replace deeply held
positional and defensive assumptions.
Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually
been built, whether a shift of orientation by him or his admirals toward
“global naval power” would have occurred remains undemonstrated and
problematic.
WILLARD C. FRANK, JR.

Old Dominion University

Buker, George E. The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2002. 195pp. $32.95

In the various history books on the
American Revolution, the Penobscot
expedition is rarely mentioned in any
detail, being overshadowed by the more
widely known and successful battles
and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to
the dismal outcome of this early joint
amphibious operation and to the desire
by some, especially Massachusetts politicians of the time, to forget what had
happened.
This hastily conceived expedition was
launched from Boston in July 1779. The
expedition was given the task of expelling the mounting British military
presence on coastal Maine, centered
around Penobscot Bay, but specifically
at Castine. The expedition set off with
full expectation of success on the part
of the Massachusetts political leadership. But from the beginning, the force
assembled was hampered by inadequate
leadership, divided command authority, poor training and support, and a
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significant lack of understanding of the
tactical situation. In this book, George
Buker, a retired Navy commander, professor of history, and an accomplished
author, provides a significant account
of this much overlooked effort by the
combined forces of the Massachusetts
and Maine militia, Continental Navy
and Marines, and various privateer
groups. Buker also provides an interesting glimpse of the internal politics and
personalities of the colonies, especially
in Massachusetts during the American
Revolution. He further provides a complementary argument that the Massachusetts political authorities, when
confronted with the dismal failure of
the expedition, set in motion an inquiry
that may have been a conspiracy of political self-interest.
The book appears well researched, with
significant endnotes and bibliography.
Reading almost like a novel, it tells the
story of the Penobscot expedition in
great detail and addresses the issues that
led up to its failure and the resulting inquiry. In appropriately titled chapters
Buker provides a historical overview
leading up to the expedition, including
the British policy, orders for military
operations along coastal Maine, and,
of course, the colonial response to the
threat to the extended territory of
Massachusetts, now the state of Maine.
As expected, the majority of the book
deals with the actual operations, from
outfitting and the order of battle to the
assaults and resulting siege at Castine,
to the hasty retreat and then rout of colonial forces when superior Royal Navy
forces arrived, and finally to the sequel,
in which the expedition’s personnel
walked back to Massachusetts from
Maine after burning their ships. After
the failure of the expedition and the
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loss of almost forty ships, recriminations were made against various leaders,
including allegations against naval force
commander Captain Dudley Saltonstall
of responsibility for the overall result;
and against Paul Revere, an icon of the
Revolutionary War who served in the
expedition as a lieutanant colonel in
charge of the artillery, of unsoldierly
conduct. In the end, it was Captain
Saltonstall who bore the brunt of the
smear campaign by Massachusetts politicians to shift the blame.
In the final chapters, and through the
lens of history, Buker argues that indeed a conspiracy by the Massachusetts
politicians, through their committee of
inquiry, manipulated the results of their
investigation and attempted to influence the outcome of the court-martial
of Saltonstall by Continental Navy authorities. Their efforts ensured the desired results of exonerating their native
son, militia general Solomon Lovell,
and provided the justification needed to
assess the Continental government for a
portion of the monetary cost. Buker,
however, provides technical and tactical
reasons that may have led to the failure
of the expedition. Further, he indicates
that only Captain Saltonstall fully appreciated the tactical and operational
circumstances, as well as the limited capability of his resources and ships in the
confined waters around Penobscot Bay.
These considerations were evidently excluded or ignored by the politicians in
their single-minded desire to find a
scapegoat for the failure.
Overall, this is a fine historical accounting of this chapter in American history.
My one large criticism is that the one
simple map provided is inadequate for
a full understanding of the operations.
This reviewer has the benefit of having
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been stationed in Castine, Maine, and is
geographically aware of the area; I have
walked the earthen ramparts of Fort
George and the various other entrenchments around Castine. It would have
been most helpful to the general reader
had additional detailed military maps
been included with each phase of the
expedition. Well placed photographs of
the area would have further added to
the historical understanding of the
events, as would photos of the various
earthworks, trenches, the defensive
canal, and Fort George, which all still
exist as historical landmarks.
JAMES B. GOODMAN

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

West, Bing. The Pepperdogs. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2002. 365pp. $25

The Pepperdogs ranks with The Hunt for
Red October. It is a work of fiction constructed around reality, brimming with
action and genuine insight into the
emerging warfighting capabilities of the
new ground soldier. West develops his
story around a Marine reconnaissance
team. That team, the “Pepperdogs,” is
made up of six reservists of varying civilian backgrounds; all have extraordinary courage, physical and mental
strength, expert tactical skills, and total
team commitment.
The Pepperdogs set out on their own to
rescue a team member captured by
rogue Serbian guerrillas who specialize
in casual atrocities. West’s story takes
place in Kosovo, mostly in mountainous
terrain and in the harshest of winter
conditions. In pursuit of the kidnappers
the team undergoes nearly constant
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attack, endures brutal weather, and creates an increasingly difficult political
situation for senior national security
leaders who believe the Pepperdogs are
risking diplomatic solutions. There is at
one point the suggestion that even the
murder of one Marine would not be
worth upsetting diplomatic peace initiatives. The Pepperdogs make political
matters worse by leaving a path of destruction while ignoring direct orders
to end their chase.
Setbacks are many, but perseverance
and tactical teamwork always (well, almost always) gets them out of tight
spots. One remembers those great moments when the cavalry arrived and
everyone cheered. But this team is different from the cavalry; the Pepperdogs
take performance-enhancing drugs and
rarely need to rest. One team member
creates an Internet website that provides the public with real-time information on their progress and problems.
The public cheers them on, reducing
the policy-making flexibility of political
leaders. West skillfully introduces the
Internet as a source of potential direct
information from individuals in the
battle to the public. That information
would have obvious constraining effects
on future national security decisionmaking latitude and would yield different perspectives on progress and
problems.
The suspense and many sudden turns
of fortune keep the reader glued to the
story. One cannot help but choose sides
between the Marine team and political
leaders who wish to halt the pursuit of
the kidnapped Marine. Even if the team
succeeds and its members become public heroes, they may be court-martialed
for disobeying orders.
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